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THE SCOPE OF THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY'S SHERMAN ACT
EXEMPTION: NEW CONSIDERATIONS
The McCarran-Ferguson Act' (the McCarran Act) permits the states
to exempt the insurance business from the Sherman Act. 2 However, the
states cannot exempt all anticompetitive practices; section 3(b) of the
McCarran Act makes the Sherman Act applicable to any anticompetitive
practice that can be characterized as boycott, coercion, or intimidation. 3
In the 1977 decision in Barry v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance' the
'United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit considered the extent
to which anticompetitive practices in the insurance business are subject to
the Sherman Act by virtue of section 3(b) of the McCarran Act. Prior to the
decision in Barry, section 3(b) had been held to apply exclusively to the
boycott, coercion and intimidation of insurance companies and agents by
other insurance companies and agents. 5 This limitation on section 3(b)
barred insurance policyholders from bringing an action under the Sherman
Act even if they alleged that they had been boycotted, coerced or in-
timidated by a group of insurance companies.° In Barry, the First Circuit
rejected the contention that this limitation on section 3(b) was necessary in
order to avoid emasculation of the insurance business' antitrust exemption
and held that policyholders who allege that they have been boycotted by a
group of insurance companies can bring an action under the Sherman
Act.' •
This note will consider whether the Barry court was correct in reject-
ing the view that section 3(b) should be limited in order to avoid emascula-
' 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1970).
15 U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (Supp. V 1975), §§ 4-7 (1970).
3 15 U.S.C. § 1013(b) (1970).
' 555 F.2d 3 (1st Cir.), cert. granted, 98 S.Ct. 391 (1977).
' Meicler v. Aetna Cas, & Sur. Co., 506 F.2d 732, 734 (5th Cir. 1975); Addrisi v. Equit-
able Life Assurance Soc'y, 503 F.2d 725, 728-29 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S, 929
(1975); Mcllhenny v. American Title Ins. Co., 418 F. Supp. 364, 371 (E.D. Pa. 1976);
Frankford Hosp. v. Blue Cross, 417 F. Stipp. 1104, 1110 (E.D. Pa. 1976), affd, 554 F.2d 1253
(3d Cir. 1977); Royal Drug Co. v. Group Life & Health Ins. Co., 415 F. Supp. 343, 350 (W.D.
Tex. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 556 F.2d 1375 (5th Cir. 1977); Seasongood v, K & K Ins.
Agency, 414 F. Supp. 698, 702 (E.D. Mo. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 548 F.2d 729 (8th Cir.
1977); Mathis v, Automobile Club Inter-Ins. Exch., 410 F. Stipp, 1037, 1041 (W.D. Mo. 1976);
Proctor v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 406 F. Supp. 27, 32 (D.D.C. 1975), rev'd, 561 F. 2d
262 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (decided after Bony); Mitgang v. Western Title ins. Co., f1974-21 TRADE
REG. REP. (CCH)1175,322, 98,026, (N.D. Cal. 1974); Transnational Ins. Co. v. Rosenlund, 261
F. Supp. 12, 26.27 (D. Ore. 1966).
But see Battle v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 493 F.2d 39 (5th Cir. 1974), cell, denied, 419
U.S. 1110 (1975), involving business dealings that were not part of the business of insurance
and therefore were not exempt from the Sherman Act by § 2(b) of the McCarran Act, where
the court summarily observed in dictum that §3(b) would preclude dismissal of the complaint
even if' the business dealings were part of the business of insurance because coercion was in-
volved. Battle, 493 F.2d at 50. Similarly, in Ballard v. Blue Shield, 543 F.2d 1075 (4th Cir.
1976), cert.' denied, 430 U.S. 922 (1977), the court allowed chiropractors who alleged that they
had been boycotted by an insurance company to bring an action under the Sherman Act. Id.
at 1078. Neither the Ballard nor the Battle court considered whether § 3(b) applied only to
conduct by insurance companies and agents aimed at other insurance companies and agents.
See, e.g., Meider v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 506 F.2d 732, 734-35 (5th Cir. 1975).
555 F.2d at 12. Nevertheless, the Bony court examined carefully the McCarran Act's
legislative history. Based on this examination the court concluded that neither the Act itself
nor its legislative history showed that Congress intended § 3(b) to apply solely to conduct by
insurance companies and agents aimed at other insurance companies and agents. Id.
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tion of the insurance business' antitrust exemption. First, this note will
examine those provisions of the McCarran Act which deal with the applica-
bility of the antitrust laws to the insurance business. Then the different in-
terpretations courts have placed on section 3(b) in an effort to reconcile
those provisions will be evaluated. Finally, the note will consider the extent
to which the insurance business would be subject to liability for various
common Sherman Act violations if no limitation were placed on section
3(b). Based on the extent of this liability, it will be submitted that the in-
surance industry's Sherman Act exemption would retain force even if sec-
tion 3(b) were broadly construed and that therefore the First Circuit was
correct in concluding that no limitation need be placed on section 3(b) in
order to avoid emasculation of the insurance business' Sherman Act
exemption.
I. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE EXEMPTION FROM THE SHERMAN Acr
AND SECTION 3(b) OF THE MCCARRAN ACT
A. The McCarran Act
The McCarran Act was passed in the wake of the Supreme Court's
decision in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Associations that the
business of insurance is interstate commerce.° As a result of the South-
Eastern Underwriters decision, the insurance industry, as well as members of
Congress, feared that state regulation of the insurance business would be
preempted by those federal laws which regulate interstate commerce'° and
by the broad sweep of the commerce clause." Responding to these con-
cerns, Congress passed the McCarran Act."
The McCarran Act prevents federal preemption by providing that
congressional silence with respect to insurance regulation is not to be con-
strued as imposing any barrier to state regulation" and that existing fed-
eral laws shall not interfere with state regulation of insurance unless the
federal statute relates specifically to insurance." With respect to federal
antitrust laws, section 2(b) of the McCarran Act provides that the Sherman
Act, the Clayton Act, and the Federal Trade Commission Act are applicable
" 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
t' Id. at 539.
''' 91 CONG. REC. 483 (1945). Senator O'Mahoney expressly mentioned the Robinson-
Patman Act, the National Labor Relations Act, and the Fair Labor Standards Act.
" U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
12
 9I CoNG. REC. 478-79, 481-82, 488, 1484, 1488 (1945).
The South -Eastern Underwriters Court, apparently in an effort to deal with the un-
certainty that its decision would create, said that the long history of state regulation and taxa-
tion of the insurance business and the absence of conflicting congressional action would be
strong reasons to uphold state regulatory and tax laws. 322 U.S. at 548-49.
la
 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (1970) provides:
Congress hereby declares that the continued regulation and taxation by the sev-
eral States of the business of insurance is in the public interest, and that silence
on the part of the Congress shall not be construed to impose any barrier to the
regulation or taxation of such business by the several States.
' 1 1d. at § 1012(b). "No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or
supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of in-
surance, or which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act specifically relates
to the business of insurance ... ."Id.
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to the insurance business only to the extent that such business is not
regulated by state law." However, the exemption granted by section 2(b) of
the McCarran Act is limited by section 3(b), which provides that "[n]othing
contained in this chapter shall render the said Sherman Act inapplicable to
any agreement to boycott, coerce, or intimidate, or act of boycott, coercion,
or intimidation."'"
The limitation contained in section 3(b) creates a conflict between that
section and section 2(b). Whereas section 2(b) provides for state regulation
of the insurance business, section 3(b) provides that certain insurance prac-
tices are regulated by the Sherman Act. Accordingly the scope of these two
sections of the McCarran Act depends on the interpretation of the boycott,
coercion or intimidation language of section 3(b). If boycott, coercion and
intimidation refer only to conduct by insurance companies and agents
aimed at other insurance companies and agents, then the scope of section
3(b) is narrow and the insurance business is substantially exempt from the
Sherman Act. If, however, any act of boycott, coercion or intimidation falls
under section 3(b), then the insurance business' exemption from the Sher-
man Act is much more limited. Thus the scope of the insurance industry's
Sherman Act exemption under section 2(b) of the McCarran Act depends
upon what practices constitute boycott, coercion or intimidation so as to fall
under section 3(b).
B. Judicial Resolution of the Conflict Between Sections 2(b) and 3(b)
Prior to the First Circuit's 1977 decision in Barry, the Ninth and Fifth
Circuit courts of appeals and several federal district courts considered the
scope of the insurance industry's Sherman Act liability under sections 2(b)
and 3(b) of the McCarran Act. The Ninth Circuit dealt with a policyhold-
er's suit in which it was alleged that an insurance company's tying the
granting of low interest mortgage loans to the purchase of life insurance
policies fell under section 3(b).' 7 The Fifth Circuit confronted a policyhold-
er's allegation that his insurance company had increased his rate classifica-
tion and that other insurance companies then had refused to sell him in-
surance at the original lower rate." In addition, various federal district
courts determined the scope of the insurance business' Sherman Act
exemption in such contexts as a suit by a policyholder alleging that title in-
surance companies conspired to require mechanics' lien riders on all title
policies," suits by pharmacists2° and hos
' 5 1d.
"[A]fter June 30, 1948, the Act 	 known as the Sherman Act and the Act ... known
as the Clayton Act, and the Act ... known as the Federal Trade Commission Act, ... shall be
applicable to the business of insurance to the extent that such business is not regulated by
State law." Id.
' 6 Id. at § 1013(b).
T
 Addrisi v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 503 F.2d 725, 726 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. de-
nied, 420 U.S. 929 (1975).
'" Meicler v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co„ 506 F.2d 732, 733 (5th Cir. 1975).
12
 Mcllhenny v. American Title Ins. Co., 418 F. Supp. 364, 366 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
2" Royal Drug Co. v. Group Life and Health Ins. Co., 415 F. Supp. 343, 345 (W.D. Tex.
1976), rev'd on other grounds, 556 F.2d 1375 (5th Cir. 1977).
2 ' Frankford Hosp. v. Blue Cross, 417 F. Supp. 1104, 1108 (E.D. Pa. 1976), affd, 554
F.2d 1253 (3d Cir. 1977).
pitals2 ' alleging that Blue Cross-
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Blue Shield's preferential reimbursement of vendors with whom it had en-
tered into contracts violated the Sherman Act, and a suit by a policyholder
alleging that a requirement that she purchase a membership in an au-
tomobile club in order to become insured violated the. Sherman Act." All
of these courts dismissed the policyholders' suits and concluded that section
3(b) applied only to conduct of' insurance companies and agents aimed at
other insurance companies and agents. However, none of these courts pro-
vided sufficient support for their conclusion that the applicability of section
3(b) must be limited. -
The first court to consider the question, the United States District
Court for the District of Oregon, stated in dictum that the legislative his-
tory of the McCarran Act shows that section 3(b) was placed in the Act only
to protect insurance companies and agents from blacklisting. 23 However,
this dictum was accompanied neither by any analysis of the legislative his-
tory nor by an explanation of why it was necessary to consult the legislative
history to construe the relatively straightforward statutory language. The
Ninth Circuit cited the Oregon federal district court case and merely stated
in a single sentence that a failure to limit section 3(b) would vitiate the con-
cept of state regulation of the insurance business. 24 Similarly, the Fifth Cir-
cuit concluded, also in one sentence, that the failure to limit section 3(b)
would emasculate the antitrust exemption in section 2(b). 25 As a result both
the Fifth and the Ninth Circuit courts adopted the Oregon district court's
conclusion and held that section 3(b) applied only to conduct by insurance
companies and agents aimed at other insurance companies and agents.
Thus, by the time the First Circuit considered the applicability of section
3(b) of the McCarran Act in Barry, an assertion that first appeared as dic-
tum gradually had become well established. None of the courts which ad-
vanced a narrow construction of section 3(b), however, had analyzed either
the legislative history upon which they had relied or the assertion that sec-
tion 3(b) must be limited in order to avoid emasculating section 2(b).
The momentum for limiting the applicability of section 3(b) was
diffused by the decision in Barry. Despite all of the contrary authority, the
First Circuit refused to conclude that such a limitation was necessary to
avoid emasculation of the antitrust exemption in section 2(b)28 or to avoid
vitiation of the policy of state regulation of the business of insurance." Ac-
cordingly, the First Circuit allowed a group of physicians to maintain an ac-
tion for injunctive relief and treble damages under the Sherman Act 28
22 Mathis v. Automobile Club Inter-Ins. Exch., 410 F. Supp. 1037, 1038 (W.D. Mo.
1976).
23 Transnational Ins. Co. v. Rosenlund, 261 F. Supp. 12, 26-27 (D. Ore. 1966).
Addrisi v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 503 F.2d 725 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 929 (1975).
" Meicler v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 506 F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1975).
" 555 F.2d at 7, 9.
"Id.
28 At the time Congress passed the McCarran Act, 7 of the Sherman Act allowed a
private party to bring an action for violation of the Sherman Act and to recover triple dam-
ages. In 1955 Congress repealed § 7 of the Sherman Act deeming it redundant in view of an
identical provision in § 4 of the Clayton Act. S. Rai.. No. 619, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted
in (1955] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2328, 2329. Because § 2(b) of the McCarran Act makes
the Clayton Act inapplicable to the insurance business it appeared that a private party could
not bring an action for a violation of the Sherman Act in the insurance business. Nevertheless,
courts have concluded that Congress did not intend to remove the right of private action and
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against insurance companies 29 who had refused to sell them malpractice in-
surance on any basis."
The court supported its conclusion that it was not necessary to limit
section 3(b) .by pointing out that even if section 3(b) were not limited, the
McCarran Act would continue to exempt the insurance business both from
federal laws which do not relate specifically to insurance and from chal-
lenges based on the commerce clause." In addition, the court reasoned,
the exemption from the Clayton Act and the Federal Trade Commission
Act also would remain intact." With respect to the Sherman Act, the Barry
court observed that failure to limit section 3(b) would not subject all in-
surance practices to the Sherman Act." Rather, the First Circuit suggested
that the insurance business would be partially exempt from the Sherman
Act because predatory pricing and benign means to maintain a monopoly
are Sherman Act violations that cannot be characterized as boycott, coer-
cion or intimidation. 34 As such, the court reasoned that these practices
would be exempt from the Sherman Act even if section 3(b) were not lim-
ited. The Barry court therefore concluded that the McCarran Act would
not be emasculated if section 3(b) applied to more than just conduct by in-
surance companies and agents aimed at other insurance companies and
agents."
C. The Validity of the Barry Court's Resolution of the Conflict
The holding in Barry limits the scope of the insurance business' Sher-
man Act exemption to a far greater extent than do the holdings of either
the Fifth or the Ninth Circuits. In order to determine the proper scope of
the Sherman Act exemption it is necessary to analyze the predicate for the
differing interpretations of that scope: that is, it is necessary to analyze
whether the failure to limit section 3(b) would result in the emasculation of
the insurance business' Sherman Act exemption. In this light, there are two
respects in which the First Circuit's opinion in Barry falls short of dem-
onstrating that such a limitation is unnecessary.
therefore they have not construed the repeal of § 7 as removing that right. Monarch Life Ins.
Co. v. Loyal Protective Life Ins. Co., 326 F.2d 841, 844 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S.
952 (1964); Professional and Businessmen's Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers Life Co., 163 F. Supp.
274, 295 (D. Mont. 1958).
" 555 F.2d at 5. The defendants all sold malpractice insurance to Rhode Island physi-
cians. When St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance changed its underwriting policies so as to ef-
fect a change in coverage, the plaintiffs sought coverage from the other defendants. Id.
"Id. The plaintiffs conceded that the defendants' conduct was within the business of
insurance and was regulated by the State of Rhode Island. Id. at 6. In light of these conces-
sions the defendants' conduct would have been exempt from the Sherman Act unless it was
deemed to fall under § 3(b).
31 Id. at 8.
32 Id.
as id.
" Id. The court cited Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 43 (1911) as an
example of predatory pricing and United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416
(2d Cir. 1945) as an example of benign means to maintain a monopoly. Id.
35 555 F.2d at 8. The court also observed that the doctrine of Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S.
341 (1943) would protect state regulatory schemes from antitrust liability and that legislative
and judicial policy had been to narrow rather than expand exceptions to the antitrust laws.
555 F.2d at 8-9.
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First, the Barry court's observation that failure to limit section 3(b)
would not emasculate those portions of the McCarran Act dealing with
other federal laws, the commerce clause, the Clayton Act and the Federal
Trade Commission Act" is not relevant to the conflict between sections
2(b) and 3(b). Section 3(b) affects only the Sherman Act's applicability to
the business of insurance; it has no effect on the applicability of any other
law. Therefore, the only exemption that section 3(b) has any potential of
emasculating is the exemption from the Sherman Act. The applicability of
other federal laws, the commerce clause, • the Clayton Act or the Federal
Trade Commission Act to the insurance business is neither increased nor
diminished by placing any limitation on section 3(b).
The second weakness in the Barry court's analysis is the court's treat-
ment of the conflict between section 3(b) and that portion of the McCarran
Act which exempts the insurance business from the Sherman Act. By citing
predatory pricing and benign means of maintaining a monopoly as exam-
ples of Sherman Act violations which would be exempt from the Sherman
Act even if section 3(b) were not limited," the Barry court demonstrated
that section 3(b) could not render the Sherman Act exemption completely
meaningless.
The fact that section 3(b) does not render the insurance business'
Sherman Act exemption completely meaningless arguably defeats the ra-
tionale for limiting section 3(b). The rationale for limiting section 3(b) is
defeated by showing that such limitation does not emasculate the exemp-
tion: it is not necessary, nor is it possible, to show that section 3(b) does not
limit the Sherman Act exemption. 38 By providing two examples of Sher-
man Act violations that would remain exempt from the Sherman Act even
if no limitation were placed on section 3(b), the Barry court has shown that
the Sherman Act exemption would retain some meaning.
There are, nevertheless, two convincing reasons for believing that the
First Circuit has not shown that a failure to limit section 3(b) will not ren-
der the Sherman Act exemption sufficiently meaningless to justify limiting
section 3(b). First, the Barry court's examples of predatory pricing and be-
nign means to maintain a monopoly both are violations of section 2 of the
Sherman Act. Since the First Circuit's examples go only to section 2 liabil-
ity, the Barry decision does not foreclose the argument that a failure to
limit section 3(b) would render the insurance business completely subject to
section 1 of the Sherman Act. Yet the language of section 3(b) makes it
" 555 F.2d at 8.
57 1d.
38
 Section 3(b) necessarily conflicts with the insurance business' Sherman Act exemption.
Even if the applicability of § 3(b) were limited to conduct by insurance companies and agents
aimed at other insurance companies and agents, Sherman Act violations, exempt but for
3(b), become subject to the Sherman Act by virtue of § 3(b). This is illustrated by United
States v, Insurance Bd., 144 F. Supp, 684 (N.D. Ohio 1956). There, the government attacked
inter alia Insurance Board rules which prohibited insurance agents from doing business with
either mutual insurance companies or companies that bypassed agents in writing policies. Id.
at 687. These rules were subject to the Sherman Act not only because they were boycotts but
because they were also conduct by insurance companies and agents aimed at other insurance
companies and agents. Accord, American Family Life Assurance Co. v. Blue Cross, 346 F.
Stipp. 267, 268 (S.D. Fla. 1972), affd, 486 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. New Or-
leans Ins. Exch., 148 F. Stipp. 915, 917 (E.D. L..a.),affd per curiarn, 355 U.S. 22 (1957).
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clear that Congress did not intend that section to expose completely the
business of insurance to section 1 liability. Had Congress intended to do so
it would have provided for the application of section 1 by specifically re-
ferring to it in section 3(13) 51) rather than using "boycott, coercion or in-
timidation" language which has no counterpart in section 1. Thus, prevent-
ing section 1 of the Sherman Act from complete application to the in-
surance business would be in accord with congressional intent as man-
ifested by the language of section 3(b) and therefore would constitute a jus-
tification for limiting section 3(h).
Another argument for limiting section 3(b) which the Barry opinion
does not foreclose is the possibility that, if no limitation were placed on sec-
tion 3(b), the insurance business would be subject to liability for all of the
more common violations of the Sherman Act such as price fixing,'" tying
arrangements,'" allocation of markets, 4 " resale price maintenance,'" con-
spiracies to crush competitors, 44 and the granting of exclusive territories. 45
If the failure to limit section 3(b) left the insurance business subject to all of
these Sherman Act violations, the insurance business would be subject to
the Sherman Act to virtually the same extent as a business that did not
have the benefit of any exemption. Yet the very fact that the McCarran Act
was passed shows that Congress intended that the insurance business' liabil-
ity to the Sherman Act be different from the Sherman Act. liability of other
businesses. Thus, expanding the scope of the insurance business' Sherman
Act exemption so as to distinguish the Sherman Act liability of the in-
surance business from the Sherman Act liability of other businesses is in ac-
cord with the purposes of the McCarran Act as a whole and therefore
would constitute a justification for limiting section 3(b)..
That the insurance business might be completely subject to section 1
of the Sherman Act or that it might be subject to liability for all of the
more common violations of the Sherman Act indicates that the Barry opin-
ion has not foreclosed the possibility that it may be necessary to limit sec-
tion 3(b) in order to avoid rendering the insurance business' antitrust
exemption meaningless. To the extent that those business practices which
ordinarily violate section 1 of the Sherman Act can be characterized as
boycott, coercion or intimidation, they will be subject to the Sherman Act
by virtue of section 3(b) of the McCarran Act. If section 3(b) exposes those
practices to the Sherman Act it emasculates the insurance business' exemp-
tion from the Sherman Act. To determine whether a broad construction of
section 3(b) would emasculate this exemption thus requires determining
whether common violations of section 1 of the Sherman Act can be charac-
terized as boycott, coercion or intimidation.
" See 555 F.2d at 14 (Campbell, J., dissenting). Judge Campbell pointed out in dissent
that the language of § 3(b) ("boycott, coercion and intimidation") did not track the language of
§ 1 of the Sherman Act ("contract, combination ... or conspiracy"). Id.
4" See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, '223 (1940).
41 See, e.g., Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5.7 (1958).
42 See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972).
43 See, e.g., Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 400 (1911).
44 See, e.g., Atlantic Heel Co. v. Allied Heel Co., 284 F.2d 879, 884 (1st Cir. 1960).
"See, e.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 97 S. Ct. 2549, 2562.63 (1977).
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II. MEASURING THE IMPACT OF SECTION 3(b) ON THE INSURANCE
BUSINESS' EXEMPTION FROM THE SHERMAN ACT
A. What Constitutes a Boycott
To determine whether a particular business practice may be charac-
terized as boycott, coercion or intimidation it is necessary to determine
whether that practice comports with the definitions of boycott, coercion or
intimidation. Because most Sherman Act violations do not involve coercion
or intimidation, no matter how these terms are defined, the critical de-
termination is whether the business practice comports with the definition of
boycott."
The Supreme Court has defined a boycott as a concerted refusal to
deal.'" Since violations of section 1 of the Sherman Act, by that section's
own terms, must involve a contract, combination or conspiracy," and since
this requirement is substantially identical to the concerted action require-
46
 Neither coercion nor intimidation have Sherman Act definitions. The word "coerce"
does appear in § 8(b)(1)(A) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1) (1970),
and there are many cases which find that specific acts constitute coercion under that act. See,
e.g., National Cash Register Co. v. NLRB, 466 F.2d 945, 960 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410
U.S. 966 (1973); Booster Lodge No. 405, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists - v. NLRB, 459 F.2d 1143,
1154-55 (D.C. Cir. 1972), affd per curiam, 412 U.S. 84 (1973).
Construing a Colorado law making it illegal for a manufacturer to "induce or coerce, or
attempt to induce or coerce" a dealer, the court in General Motors Corp. v. Blevins, 144 F.
Supp. 381 (D. Colo. 1956) said that "inducing" was "the process of salesmanship" and persua-
sion "by legitimate argument or demonstration" whereas to "coerce" was to "compel by threat
or other wrongful action." Id. at 394. Courts also have defined coercion in a criminal context,
Rhode Island Recreation Center, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 177 F.2d 603, 605 (1st Cir.
1949), the coercion necessary to make a confession involuntary and therefore inadmissible into
evidence, Garrity v. New jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 496 (1967), and the coercion necessary to make
a payment involuntary, Radich v. Hutchins, 95 U.S. 210, 213 (1877).
The word "intimidation" occurs frequently in criminal statutes, see, e.g„ 18 U.S.C.
§2113(a) (1970), where it means to "make fearful or put into fear." See United States v. Jac-
quillon, 469 F.2d 380, 385 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 938 (1973).
The words "coercion" and "intimidation" do appear together in the Automobile Dealer
Suits against Manufacturers Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1225 (1970), which provides for a mutual
duty "to guarantee the one party freedom from coercion, intimidation, or threats of coercion
or intimidation from the other party ...." Id. at 1221(e). The court in Berry Bros. Buick,
Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 257 F. Supp. 542 (E.D. Pa. 1966), affd per curiam, 377 F.2d 552
(3d Cir. 1967) distinguished coercion from arbitrary behavior and said that coercion involved
"a wrongful demand which will result in sanctions if not complied with." Id. at 546.
In Frankford Hosp. v. Blue Cross, 417 F. Supp. 1104, 1111-12 (E.D. Pa. 1976), affd,
554 F.2d 1253 (3d Cir. 1977), the court dealt with the terms "coercion" and "intimidation" as
they appear in § 3(b) of the McCarran Act. The plaintiff in Frankford Hospital alleged that
Blue Cross' refusal to fully reimburse its subscribers for the cost of plaintiff's services unless
the plaintiff signed Blue Cross' standard contract was coercion. Id. The court rejected this
claim, saying that Blue Cross was using its subscribers' business to induce the plaintiff to sign
the contract. Id. at 1111. The court also rejected the plaintiff's claim that Blue Cross' placing
newspaper ads advising its subscribers that they would not be reimbursed fully for the cost of
plaintiff's services was intimidation. Id.
Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959). This is the def-
inition under the Sherman Act but the word has the same meaning under the McCarran Act.
Cooperative De Seguros Multiples De P.R. v. San Juan, 294 F. Supp. 627, 628 (D. P.R. 1968).
See Monarch Life Ins. Co. v. Loyal Protective Life Ins. Co., 326 F.2d 841, 846 (2d Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 376 U.S. 952 (1964); Transnational Ins. Co. v. Rosenlund, 261 F. Supp. 12, 27 (D.
Ore. 1966).
4" 15 U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. V 1975).
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ment in the definition of boycott, it would seem that whenever the former
has been met that the latter also will have been met. 49 Contracts, combina-
tions or conspiracies that violate section I of the Sherman Act but are not
"concerted" as that term is used in the definition of boycott could not be
characterized as boycotts and therefore would be exempt from the Sher-
man Act whether or not any limitation is placed on section 3(b). To the ex-
tent that such section 1 violations exist, they add support to the Barry
court's contention that it is not necessary to limit section 3(b) in order to
avoid emasculation of the insurance business' Sherman Act exemption.
Examination of trade restraints involving a contract, combination or
conspiracy, however, indicates that most such restraints seem to satisfy the
concerted action component of a boycott. For these restraints,, the de-
termination of whether they can be characterized as boycotts depends on
whether they satisfy the other component of a boycott, that is whether they
also involve a refusal to deal. In determining whether a Sherman Act viola-
tion involves a refusal to deal, it is not sufficient to rely on the judicial
characterization of the violation. A Sherman Act violation involving both
concerted action and a refusal to deal often is not characterized as a
boycott if the refusal to deal has been used to implement another trade re-
straint. 5 °
The use of a refusal to deal to implement another Sherman Act viola-
tion was clearly illustrated in United States v. Parke, Davis and Company." In
Parke, Davis, a pharmaceutical manufacturer refused to supply retailers
who did not maintain the manufacturer's suggested minimum resale
prices. 52 The Court concluded that the manufacturer had violated section 1
of the Sherman Act, characterizing the violation as a conspiracy between
the manufacturer and the retailers to maintain resale prices." Although
the manufacturer in Parke, Davis conspired to maintain resale prices, the
49 Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (Supp. V 1975), provides that "lelvery
person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any
other person or persons, to monopolize ... shall be deemed guilty of a felony ...." Id. Viola-
tions of § 2 of the Sherman Act, therefore, unlike violations of § I, need not involve a con-
tract, combination or conspiracy; § 2 may be violated by a firm acting alone. If a single firm
violates § 2, the violation could not be characterized as a boycott because it would not involve
concerted action. If more than one firm violates § 2, whether or not the violation could be
characterized as a boycott would depend on whether the violation involved a refusal to deal.
See text at notes 50-81 infra.
" Whether a particular business practice is deemed a violation of the Sherman Act may
depend on how the court characterizes what was done. For example, whether the sharing of
information on the quantity and prices at which goods have been sold is deemed a Sherman
Act violation depends on whether the sharing is characterized as price fixing. Compare Ameri-
can Column and Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921) with Maple Flooring Mfrs.
Assoc. v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1924).
However, determining whether a business practice may be characterized as a boycott for
the purposes of the McCarran Act does not determine whether that business practice is a vio-
lation of the Sherman Act. A business practice may be deemed to be a boycott but not deemed
to be a Sherman Act violation. See Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke &
Liquors, Ltd., 416 F.2d 71 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1062 (1970); Molinas v. Na-
tional Basketball Assoc., 190 F. Supp. 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
II
 362 U.S. 29 (1960).
"Id. at 34.
"Id. at 45. The Court found that when Parke, Davis secured adherence to its suggested
resale prices it created a combination among its retailers to maintain resale prices. Id.
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violation also could have been characterized as a conspiracy to refuse to
deal. This alternative characterization stems from Parke, Davis' refusal to
sell to retailers who resold its products for less than the suggested resale
prices." Similar conduct was characterized as a boycott in Fashion
Originators' Guild v. FTC." In Fashion Guild, dress manufacturers refused to
sell to retailers who bought from dress manufacturers who copied dress de-
signs." Holding that such conduct violated section 1 of the Sherman Act,
the Court characterized the violation as a boycott because the dress manu-
facturers, acting in concert, refused to deal with certain retailers." By
exactly the same reasoning, the violation in Parke, Davis could have been
characterized as a boycott.
In both Parke, Davis and Fashion Guild a refusal to deal was used as a
means to another end. In Fashion Guild the dress manufacturers sought to
protect their property rights in dress designs, while in Parke, Davis the
manufacturer sought to maintain minimum resale prices. But whatever its
ultimate purpose, the restraint in Parke, Davis involved a concerted refusal
to deal and therefore, like the restraint in Fashion Guild, could have been
characterized as a boycott. 58
Although Parke, Davis illustrates that there are Sherman Act violations
which are not characterized as boycotts which do involve concerted refusals
to deal, it does not indicate the extent to which refusals to deal are neces-
sary elements of anticompetitive practices. Whether a refusal to deal is a
necessary component of a particular Sherman Act violation is important
because if it were necessary to refuse to deal in order to implement the vio-
lation then the violation always could be characterized as a boycott. And if
a violation always can be characterized as a boycott then, unless some limi-
tation is placed on section 3(b) of the McCarran Act, that violation always
will be subject to Sherman Act liability notwithstanding the insurance busi-
ness' Sherman Act exemption. On the other hand, if a violation need not
be implemented by a refusal to deal, then it falls within the insurance busi-
ness' exemption from the Sherman Act . even if no limitation is placed on
section 3(b). Accordingly, the extent to which refusals to deal are necessary
to implement Sherman Act violations will determine the extent to which
section 3(b) interferes with the insurance business' Sherman Act exemption.
" Arguably Parke, Davis' refusal to deal was not "concerted" as that term is used in the
definition of boycott because only Parke, Davis refused to deal, albeit pursuant to a conspiracy
with its retailers. Cf. Webster Motor Car Co. v. Packard Motor Car Co., 243 F.2d 418 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 822 (1959) (finding no boycott where one party urged another
party to refuse to deal with a single third party). But it seems unlikely that the behavior in, for
example, Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959) would not have been
characterized as a boycott had Broadway-Hale induced only one manufacturer to refuse to
deal with Klor's.
" 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
"Id. at 461.
-"Id. at 465.
38
 Resale price maintenance is itself a violation of the Sherman Act. Dr. Miles Medical
Co. v. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 400 (1911). Thus when the Supreme Court charac-
terized what was done in Parke, Davis as a conspiracy to maintain resale prices it was charac-
terizing what was done as a Sherman Act violation. On the other hand, protecting property
rights in dress designs is not a Sherman Act violation. Therefore in order to characterize what
was done in Fashion Guild as a Sherman Act violation the Court characterized what was done
as a conspiracy to refuse to deal.
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Thus, whether the Barry court was correct in rejecting the contention that it
is necessary to limit section 3(b) in order to avoid emasculating the in-
surance business' antitrust exemption can be answered by examining vari-
ous Sherman Act violations to determine whether refusals to deal are
necessary for their implementation.
B. The Necessity of Refusing to Deal
1. Price Fixing, Resale Price Maintenance, Fixing the Terms of Trade
The question whether a refusal to deal is necessary to implement re-
sale price maintenance, price fixing, or any agreement which establishes
terms of sale" can be answered by an examination of the nature and func-
tion of price. A refusal to deal is a component of these trade restraints be-
cause a price is an announcement of the terms upon which a seller will deal
and, by implication, the terms upon which a seller will not deal." If a seller
says that it sells widgets for five dollars, it is saying that it will not sell them
for less than five dollars. The five dollar price is, therefore, a refusal to
deal for less than that price."
Because a refusal to deal is inherent in the concept of price, a price
fixing agreement can be implemented only by a refusal to deal. Thus, if
two or more firms fix the price of certain goods and a buyer offers to buy
at a price lower than the fixed price, the sellers either can sell at the price
offered by the buyer or they can refuse to sell. If the sellers sell at the price
offered, the price fixing agreement is not being implemented. But if the
sellers refuse to sell at the price being offered, their refusal is pursuant to
the agreement fixing the price and constitutes a concerted refusal to deal."'
A refusal to deal thus is necessary to implement a price fixing agreement.
Accordingly, agreements which fix prices always can be characterized as
boycotts.
" There are other means to implement resale price maintenance or agreements fixing
either price or other terms of sale, but these other means are outside the bounds of the mar-
ket. For example, coercion or intimidation can be used to implement resale price maintenance.
Of course § 3(b) would apply to such conduct regardless of whether there were a refusal to
deal. Price fixing could also be implemented by enlisting the aid of the government. However,
government cannot violate the Sherman Act, therefore the applicability of 3(b) is immaterial.
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 352 (1943).
13 ° In United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897), involving
price-fixing in the railroad industry, the government's bill alleged that the defendants had
"declined and refused to fix or establish and maintain or give on their railroads rates and
prices for the carrying of freight .. , ." Id. at 299. But see Daily Press, Inc. v. United Press 1nel,
412 F.2d 126, 135 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 990 (1969) (dictum that a willingness to deal
but only under certain conditions is not a refusal to deal).
" 
Setting a price is not a Sherman Act violation unless it is done pursuant to a contract,
combination or conspiracy. But if a price is purstiant to a contract, combination or conspiracy,
the refusal to sell for less than that price is also pursuant to the same contract, combination or
conspiracy. And if the refusal to sell for less than that price is pursuant to a contract, combi-
nation or conspiracy, the conduct is a boycott.
" The boycott is present whether the prices are fixed by direct agreement as in United
States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 292 (1897) or by indirect methods as in
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S, 150, 224 (1940) or whether the agreement
is horizontal as in Trans-Missouri or vertical as in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co.,
220 U.S. 373, 375 (1911).
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An agreement fixing a term of sale other than the price must be im-
plemented by a refusal to deal in the same way that an agreement fixing
the price must be so implemented. Whenever a seller is confronted with a
buyer who requests terms of sale different from the terms fixed by the
agreement, the seller either must sell on the terms proposed by the buyer
and not implement the agreement or it must refuse to deal. A restriction
on the price at which a product may be resold is a term of sale, and such
restrictions, like agreements fixing any other term of sale, therefore, can be
implemented only by a refusal to deal." Because refusals to deal are neces-
sary to implement agreements fixing prices and other terms of sale, such
activities in the insurance business will not be exempt from the Sherman
Act unless some limitation is placed on section 3(b) of the McCarran Act."
Although a refusal to deal is necessary to implement agreements fix-
ing price and other terms of sale, an examination of various other Sherman
Act violations reveals that a refusal to deal is not a necessary component of
these violations. If these violations are implemented by means other than
refusals to deal, they cannot be characterized as boycotts and accordingly, if
undertaken in the insurance business, would be exempt from the Sherman
Act regardless of whether any limitation is placed on section 3(b).
2. Allocation of Markets
Agreements among competitors allocating the • total market among
themselves, as exemplified by Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States,"
provide an example of a frequently occurring Sherman Act violation that
commonly is implemented by a refusal to deal but which need not be so
implemented. Timken involved an agreement dividing the market for fric-
tion bearings along territorial lines." In addition to dividing the market
among themselves, the defendants also agreed "not to sell bearings directly,
or to others for shipment into the other party's territory ...."" This
agreement not to sell to customers allocated to other defendants was an
" If even one buyer is not bound by a restriction on resale prices, the whole price
maintenance scheme will probably collapse. if the buyer who is not bound lowers its prices, it
will force its competitors to lower their prices also. In Parke, Davis, the unwillingness of one or
two large retailers to observe the suggested resale prices caused the whole scheme to collapse.
362 U.S. at 36.
61
 The implications of this are rather startling. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-6-9 (1956) provides
that an insurance company may join a rating association and adopt the rates filed by the asso-
ciation as its own. R.I. GEN. LAws § 27-6-26 specifically allows cooperation among rating asso-
ciations and insurers in establishing rates. Many other states have similar laws. E.g., N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 414.4(E) (1955); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 24-A, c. 25 § 2309 (1974). See 6 ABA INS.
NEC., AND COMP. LAws SEcrtoN 153, 225.227, 230-31 (1964).
The First Circuit's assertion that the insurance industry has relied on the limited
applicability of 3(b) only since the decision in Transnational Ins. Co. v. Rosenlund, 261 F.
Supp. 12 (D. Ore. 1966), 555 F.2d at 7, indicates that the court may not have recognized that
its holding had far-reaching implications. These statutes allowing price fixing in the insurance
industry indicate reliance on the proposition that § 3(b) does not apply to price fixing.
65
 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
66 Id. at 595. The agreements also fixed prices and provided for cooperation to protect
each other's markets, to eliminate outside competition and to eliminate exports from and im-
ports to the United States. Id. at 596.
87
 United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 83 F. Supp. 284, 293 (N.D. Ohio 1949).
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agreement to refuse to deal with such customers. Thus, the violation in
Timken could have been characterized as a boycott."
Although the conduct in Timken could have been characterized as a
boycott, Timken itself suggests a mechanism other than a refusal to deal'
which could be used to implement an agreement allocating markets. In ad-
dition to dividing the market among themselves, each defendant in Timken
agreed to pay any other defendant five percent of the sales price of any
sales it made to that other defendant's customers." Had the defendants in
Timken not agreed to refuse to deal with customers allocated to each other
but merely agreed to the five percent penalty provision, buyers could have
bought from whomever they wished and sellers could have sold to
whomever they wished." Hence, there would have been no boycott.
The hypothetical suggested by Timken indicates that market allocation
schemes do not necessarily involve refusals to deal and therefore cannot be
characterized a fortiori as boycotts. Market allocation schemes in the in-
surance business implemented without refusals to deal would be exempt
from the Sherman Act regardless of whether section 3(b) were limited to
conduct by insurance companies and agents aimed at other insurance com-
panies and agents.
3. Tying Arrangements
Tying arrangements, like market allocation schemes, often have been
implemented by a refusal to deal, but, as in the case of market allocation
schemes, a refusal to deal may not be essential for their implementation."
International Salt Co. v. United States" provides an example of a tying ar-
rangement that need not have been implemented by a refusal to deal.
In International Salt the defendant utilized equipment leases containing
a provision which required the lessee to use only International's salt in the
leased equipment." A lessee who agreed to this provision essentially agreed
"The market allocation schemes in other cases also have involved agreements not to
deal with customers allocated to a competitor and therefore, like the market allocation scheme
in Timken, can be characterized as boycotts. See United States v. Holophane Co., 119 F. Supp.
114, 117 (S.D. Ohio 1954), affd per curiam, 352 U.S. 903 (1956).
Exclusive territories arc imposed "vertically" by a common supplier whereas allocated
markets are established "horizontally" by agreement among competitors. See United States v.
Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350, 352 (1967). Agreements establishing exclusive territories, like those
establishing market allocation schemes, have involved a further agreement not to deal with
customers allocated to another dealer. Id. See White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253,
255-56 (1963).
" 83 F. Supp. at 294.
7° The penalty provision would deter a defendant from soliciting or encouraging busi-
ness from customers allocated to another defendant. To the extent that the volume of busi-
ness was dependent on such solicitation buyers would tend to buy from the defendant to
which they had been assigned. To the extent that buyers bought from defendants to which
they were not assigned, the defendant to which they had been assigned would benefit by re-
ceiving the penalty from the defendant who actually made the sale.
" In Northern P. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958) the Court defined a tying
arrangement as "an agreement by a party to sell one product but only on the condition that
the buyer also purchases a different (or tied) product, or at least agrees that he will not pur-
chase that product from any other supplier." Id. at 5-6.
" 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
"Id. at 394-95. Some of the leases provided that the lessee could deal with another
supplier, but only if International failed to match that supplier's price. Id. at 394 n.5. Even
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to refrain from buying salt from the defendant's competitors. As a result,
the violation in International Salt involved a refusal to deal and could have
been characterized as a boycott. 74
The defendant in International Salt could have employed means other
than a refusal to deal to deter its lessees from purchasing salt from its
competitors. For example, International could have imposed an additional
rental charge based on the volume of salt used in the machines and used
the proceeds of this additional charge to reduce the price of its own salt."
The effect of this charge would have been to lower the price of defendant's
salt, thereby increasing the likelihood that the lessee would buy defendant's
salt." This hypothetical suggests that tying arrangements, like market
allocation schemes, do not necessarily involve refusals to deal and therefore
cannot be characterized a fortiori as boycotts. Thus, such tying arrange-
ments in the insurance business would be exempt from the Sherman Act
regardless of whether section 3(b) were limited to conduct by insurance
companies and agents aimed at other insurance companies and agents.
4. Conspiracies to Crush Competitors
While tying arrangements and agreements allocating markets fre-
quently have involved refusals to deal, conspiracies to crush competitors
generally have been implemented by means other than refusals to deal."
though these lessees could deal with other suppliers under some circumstances the leases may
still be characterized as agreements to refuse to deal. The refusal to deal in Fashion
Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941), which was characterized as a boycott, was not
a refusal to deal under all circumstances; the manufacturers refused to deal only if the re-
tailers dealt with certain other manufacturers. Id. at 461. If refusals to deal under limited cir-
cumstances were distinguished from refusals to deal under all circumstances, it would be an
easy matter to fashion circumstances that made the refusal to deal under those circumstances
the functional equivalent of a refusal to deal under all circumstances.
" In holding that International's leases were per se violations of the Sherman Act, the
Court said that they foreclosed competitors from a substantial market. 322 U.S. at 396, citing
Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, 114 F.2d 80 (1940), alp,  312 U.S. 457 (1941). i n Fashion
Guild manufacturers refused to deal with retailers who had dealt with certain other manufac-
turers; the court characterized this conduct as a boycott. 312 U.S. at 461.
" The prerequisite for a successful tying arrangement is a quantum of monopoly power
in the market of the tying product. The ability to impose an additional rental charge and to
make the proceeds of this charge available to reduce the price of the salt is the result of this
monopoly power. In International Salt monopoly power was provided by a patent on the ma-
chines. Even if International already were charging the monopoly price for its machines it
could still raise the price of the machines and not affect revenue or the amount demanded if
it lowered the price of the salt a corresponding amount.
" Such a scheme would have been successful to the extent that the salt used in the ma-
chines could be differentiated, for pricing purposes, from other salt. One of the machines
used a salt "tablet." This suggests that it was possible to design the machine so that it would
use tablets not readily usable elsewhere.
There were probably other ways to implement the tying arrangement without refusing
to deal. In international Salt, the Court recognized that International had a legitimate interest
in controlling the quality of the salt used in the machines because International was re-
sponsible for their repair and maintenance. 322 U.S. at 397. A requirement that all salt not
supplied by International be inspected by International probably would increase the chance
that only salt supplied by International would be used in the machines. An inspection fee
would certainly accomplish this objective.
" Forgett v. Scharf, 181 F.2d 754, 755 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 825 (1950);
Northeast Airlines, Inc., v. World Airways, Inc., 262 F. Supp. 316, 317-18 (D. Mass. 1966);
Caldwell-Clements, Inc. v. Cowan Publishing Corp., 130 F. Supp. 326, 328 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
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In Atlantic Heel Co. v. Allied Heel Co., 7H the plaintiff alleged that the de-
fendant conspired with others to crush the plaintiff by establishing a com-
peting business, inducing the plaintiff's employees to quit, visiting its plant
to obtain trade secrets and interfere with production, falsely disparaging
plaintiff, wooing away salesmen, instituting lawsuits in bad faith, interfering
with sources of supplies, seeking to obtain credit under the pretense that
defendant was affiliated with plaintiff, and breaching defendant's fiduciary
duty as plaintiff's director. 79 While some of the defendant's alleged ac-
tivities may have involved refusals to dea1, 8° establishing a competing busi-
ness, obtaining trade secrets, instituting lawsuits, claiming affiliation to get
credit, interfering with production and breaching fiduciary duties do not."
Had the defendant confined itself to these means that do not involve a re-
fusal to deal its actions could not be characterized as a boycott. And if the
defendant's actions could not be characterized as a boycott, such actions,
had they occurred in the business of insurance, would be exempt from the
Sherman Act regardless of whether section 3(b) were limited to conduct by
insurance companies and agents aimed at other insurance companies and
agents.
III. THE NECESSITY OF LIMITING SECTION 3(b)
In Barry, the First Circuit used predatory pricing and benign means to
maintain a monopoly as examples to support its conclusion that the failure
to limit section 3(b) to conduct by insurance companies and agents aimed at
other insurance companies and agents would not emasculate the insurance
business' antitrust exemption. The analysis in this note has revealed that
tying arrangements, market allocation schemes and conspiracies to crush
competitors, each common violations of section 1 of the Sherman Act, also
could be exempted from the Sherman Act regardless of whether section
3(b) were limited.
Despite all this support for the Barry court's contention that section
3(b) need not be limited it still might. be argued that unless section 3(b)
were limited it would render the Sherman Act exemption sufficiently
nugatory to justify limiting the scope of section 3(b). While as a theoretical
matter it may be possible to devise market allocation schemes and tying ar-
rangements that do not involve refusals to deal, as a practical matter these
restraints generally have involved refusals to deal. Hence, unless some limi-
tation were placed on section 3(b) the insurance business effectively would
be completely subject to section 1 of the Sherman Act and would be subject
to the Sherman Act to virtually the same extent as a business that did not
' B 284 F.2d 879 (1st Cir. 1960). For 'an example of the use of a refusal to deal to crush
a competitor, see United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 136 (1966).
78
 284 F.2d at 879-80.
" Thus, for example, inducing employees to quit may have involved urging the
employees not to deal with the plaintiff or it may have involved offering them higher salaries
to work for the defendant. The opinion does not provide enough information to determine
whether inducing employees to quit involved a refusal to deal.
"' The nature of the allegations in Atlantic Heel suggests that coercion or intimidation
may have been involved. If either were, the defendant's activities would be subject to the
Sherman Act whether or not they involved a refusal to deal.
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have the benefit of any exemption. Such a result would be in direct conflict
with the legislative purpose in enacting the McCarran Act and thus would
argue for a limitation on section 3(b).
The force of this argument, however, is diminished by observing that
outside the insurance business there is no reason for one seeking to
establish a tying arrangement or market allocation scheme to avoid in-
corporating a refusal to deal because these restraints are Sherman Act vio-
lations whether or not they involve refusals to deal. Within the insurance
business, however, if section 3(b) were not limited to conduct by insurance
companies and agents aimed at other insurance companies and agents, a
tying arrangement or market allocation scheme would be exempt from the
Sherman Act only if it did not involve a refusal to deal. An insurance com-
pany's ability to avoid Sherman Act liability by avoiding refusals to deal
would be an incentive to avoid such refusals that is not present outside of
the insurance business where Sherman Act liability cannot be avoided by
avoiding refusals to deal." This incentive is likely to result in tying ar-
rangements and market allocation schemes in the insurance business that
do not involve refusals to deal.
To the extent that insurance companies ignore this incentive and en-
gage in market allocation schemes and tying arrangements that involve re-
fusals to deal and to the extent that they fix prices and other terms of sale
they would be subject to the Sherman Act, absent some limitation on sec-
tion 3(b). However, the fact that insurance companies cannot avoid liability
for certain violations if they persist in implementing them by means of re-
fusals to deal, and the fact that they cannot avoid Sherman Act liability for
certain other violations at all does not establish that section 3(b) emasculates
the insurance business' antitrust exemption. To the contrary, the Sherman
Act exemption would retain importance even if no limitations were placed
on section 3(b) because insurance companies nevertheless could avoid liabil-
ity for significant violations83 of both section 1 and section 2 of the Sher-
man Act."
" In other words if there is a loophole by which insurance companies can avoid the
Sherman Act, insurance company behavior will tend to fall within this loophole.
133
 Tying arrangements and market allocations schemes are per se violations of the
Sherman Act. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972): International
Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947). There is some authority that a conspiracy
to crush a competitor is also a per se violation. Atlantic Heel Co. v. Allied Heel Co.. 284 F.2d
879, 884 (1st Cir. 1960). A per se violation is one "which because of [its] pernicious effect on
competition and lack of any redeeming virtue [is] conclusively presumed to be unreasonable
and therefore illegal ...." Northern P. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, .5 (1958). The
sheer magnitude of the harm caused by these restraints on competition is sufficient reason to
characterize them as significant violations of the Sherman Act.
"'See text at note '26 supra. Even assuming that the word "boycott" in § 3(b) was in-
tended to include those activities traditionally referred to as boycotts, limiting 3(b) to
boycotts by insurance companies and agents aimed at other insurance companies and agents
would not effectuate this intent. What was done in Barry was a "traditional" boycott: the de-
fendants refused to deal with the plaintiffs. But the boycott could have been an effort to im-
plement an agreement fixing the terms of sale (an agreement to issue only a certain type of
policy), a market allocation scheme (Dr. Barry was assigned to St. Paul Fire and Marine In-
surance Co.), or it could have resulted from some other motive (Dr. Barry was a poor in-
surance risk). This suggests that the difference between a "traditional" boycott and price fix-
ing, market allocation schemes and other Sherman Act violations is how the court charac-
terizes what was done. See text at notes 51-59 supra.
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CONCLUSION
In Barry v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., the First Circuit jus-
tified its conclusion that no limitation need be placed on section 3(b) in
order to avoid emasculation of the insurance business' antitrust exemption
by citing two examples of violations of section 2 of the Sherman Act that
could not be characterized as boycott, coercion or intimidation. These
examples did not foreclose the argument of other courts that failure to
limit section 3(b) would completely subject the insurance business to section
1 of the Sherman Act or that it would render the insurance business sub-
ject to the Sherman Act to virtually the same extent as a business not enjoy-
ing any exemption. Comparison between various violations of section 1 of
the Sherman Act and the definition of boycott, however, demonstrates that
significant section 1 violations do not necessarily involve refusals to deal
and therefore cannot be characterized as boycotts. Since section 3(b) of the
McCarran Act chiefly requires that anticompetitive practices must involve a
boycott in order to nullify the insurance business' Sherman Act exemption,
these violations would remain exempt from the Sherman Act whether or
not any limitation were placed on section 3(b). Accordingly, the Barry court
was correct in concluding that a failure to limit section 3(b) would not
emasculate the insurance business' Sherman Act exemption.
LEONARD M. SINGER
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